away from the inter-state bargaining process toward the wider climate landscape of initiatives by states, sub-state actors, and civil society (Hoffmann 2011) .
In December of 2015, however, gridlock was overcome with the adoption of the widely heralded Paris Agreement that entered in to force on November 4 th 2016
(UNFCCC 2015b). Building on the Copenhagen Accord, the bedrock of the Paris Agreement is the voluntary 'nationally determined contributions' (NDCs) that rely upon states making commitments to reduce emissions, adapt to climate change, and provide finance. There are no legally binding targets for countries but rather a binding process for transparent review designed to make states ratchet up these commitments over time (Clemenson 2016, p. 7) .
Along with these NDCs, a crucial outcome of the Paris Agreement is that the UNFCCC has been consolidated as the central orchestrator of non-state actors and transnational initiatives in global climate governance. Orchestration is a strategy in which international organizations (IOs) and states mobilize intermediaries -private actors, civil society, transnational networks, and sub-state actors -to direct targets in the pursuit of key collective goals (Abbott et al. 2015a, Hale and Roger 2014) . The solidification of the UNFCCC as orchestrator builds upon several years of activity by the Secretariat and state governments to coordinate, harness, and mobilize non-state actors (or, in the nomenclature of the Paris Agreement, non-party stakeholders).
In particular, the Paris Agreement reflects a process whereby the UNFCCC Secretariat, by itself or jointly with states and other IOs, orchestrates various platforms of non-state climate commitments (Hale 2016) . Likewise, the COP decision Tracking these empirical developments, a vibrant literature has emerged focusing on how and why IOs engage orchestration as a mode of governance. Applied to climate governance, this work has looked at the mechanisms through which the UNFCCC Secretariat seeks to catalyze non-state action to put the world on track to limit global warming to well below 2 degrees, promote climate resilience, and push for de-carbonization (Chan et al. 2016; Chan et al. 2015 , Hsu et al. 2015 . The core question guiding this research is how to align non-state and intergovernmental action to achieve a low carbon future, focusing primarily on the effectiveness of orchestration to enlist intermediaries such as business, public-private partnerships, and cities to reach governance goals.
Here, we focus on a different question: is orchestration democratically legitimate? In answering this question, we develop a framework anchored in
'democratic values' -equal participation, deliberation, accountability, and transparency -for analyzing the legitimacy of orchestration. We engage in novel empirical analysis of two orchestration efforts undertaken by the UNFCCC Secretariat jointly with COP presidencies and the United Nation Secretary-General, namely the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA) and the Non-state Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA), which were further consolidated in GCA. We analyze these two orchestration mechanisms by applying the democratic values framework and find substantial shortcomings in participation, transparency, and accountability.
We also find positive examples, though, which provide ways to make orchestration more democratically legitimate.
Methodologically, this analysis amounts to an illustrative case-study that identifies, maps, and evaluates the democratic legitimacy of two orchestration efforts.
The empirical material for this paper is based primarily on qualitative data, such as 
Orchestration and the Democratic Deficit

Orchestration and Global Governance
Global governance -the collection of formal and informal institutions that create, alter, and propagate the rules and norms dictating state and non-state interactions in world politics -is increasingly dense and complex. As a result of this complexity, states and IOs are steadily employing orchestration to solve collective action problems and manage global governance (Abbott et al. 2015a) . Orchestration, as illustrated in Figure 1 , can be conceptualized in terms of an Orchestrator- [Insert Figure: "Orchestration" about here]
Global Governance and Democratic Legitimacy
The growth of activity beyond the state has given risen to discussions over the democratic deficit of global (climate) governance. This work predominantly recognizes that the authority once confined within national borders increasingly escapes these traditional demarcations (Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, p. 6 (Kuyper 2015) . A key finding from scholars of global governance is that democratic legitimacy matters for the performance of global governance institutions (Dingwerth 2007) . Therefore the effectiveness of orchestration may relate systematically to the legitimacy of that governance arrangement in ways that require unpacking. Based on both intrinsic and instrumental reasons, we think there are good reasons to continue probing the democratic legitimacy of global governance.
Orchestration and Democratic Legitimacy
Although work on orchestration has focused myopically on effectiveness, the persistence and proliferation of this practice also raises normative questions such as those surrounding democratic legitimacy. At its core, democratic legitimacy is required so that individuals significantly affected by the use of authority have equal say in how that authority is used. Because the usage of orchestration by bodies such as the UNFCCC involves the exercise of public authority to achieve policy goals in Relatedly, the authority exercised by international bureaucracies is increasingly removed from delegation chains through processes of agency slack in which agents carve out space to exercise authority beyond that which was delegated to them (Johnson 2013) . This also severs individuals from the exercise of authority.
Perhaps more directly, though, the practice of orchestration breaks chains of delegation between citizens who empower states and IOs with the activities of intermediaries that are recognized, mobilized, and even sanctioned by the orchestrator. Orchestrated governance is soft and the orchestrator does not have final say over intermediaries and their activities. Resultantly, there is no delegated authority that can be taken back by the IO or state governments. This lack of delegation places the democratic legitimacy of orchestration at the fore. This is a point recognized in a recent article by Kenneth Abbott and his co-authors (2015b) as they highlight the legitimacy complications engendered by orchestration. Abbott et al. (2015b, p. 9) claim that orchestration, in contrast to delegation, 'cuts the chain of electoral accountability because the orchestrator lacks hard control over intermediaries. Ultimately, intermediaries exercise their authority in an (externally) uncontrolled and unaccountable way.' As a result, they contend that this form of governance 'cannot simply be subsumed under delegation, but demands its own form of analysis.' We agree with this point and suggest that because orchestration cuts the ties between national constituents on one hand and intermediaries and targets on the other, the decision to engage in orchestration requires democratic legitimation.
Finally, some instances of orchestration entail activities by intermediaries which impact significantly upon targets. While not all orchestration efforts will reach this bar, those by the UNFCCC discussed in this article do. Both LPAA and NAZCA, which provide organizing platforms for intermediaries, are endorsed in the COP decision to the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2015c). Moreover, the UNFCCC, through the two High Level Champions, maintains that the activities of intermediaries will be essential to close the 14-17 gigaton emission gap as states strive toward a less than 2-degree pathway. 3 The decision to undertake orchestration by the UNFCCC provides resources and recognition to intermediaries as well as legitimates their activities.
Given that the Secretariat employs public authority to maintain orchestration platforms, as well as highlights the importance of these efforts in supporting NDCs (UNFCCC 2016a), it is essential that the intermediary activities contribute clearly to the core goal of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement.
Taken together, these points highlight why the democratic credentials of orchestration should be taken seriously. The use of authority by the orchestrator, as well as potential impacts of intermediaries, places a burden on the orchestrator to ensure that the decision to use authority to engage in orchestration, as well as ongoing intermediary efforts, live up to democratic standards.
Towards Democratic Legitimacy Beyond the State: A Democratic Values
Approach
How should we assess democratic legitimacy beyond the state, especially in the context of orchestration? We suggest that adopting a 'democratic values' approach is fruitful. Building on work such as Dingwerth (2007) , this approach seeks to remedy the global democratic deficit by enhancing and deepening a set of democratic values in formal and informal institutions. In this way the democratization of climate governance can be seen as a set of values that that are more or less met. We can evaluate how orchestration fares in terms of each value and then prescribe ways to enhance these values.
We recognize there are other ways to think about the democratization of climate governance. For instance, different scholars have focused on an intergovernmental approach (Keohane et al. 2009 ), a stakeholder model (Macdonald 2008) , or deliberative democratization (Stevenson and Dryzek 2014 We focus on these values because have they reflect several prominent traditions in democratic thinking, such participatory, deliberative, and liberal models. Moreover taken together these values uphold the core of democracy by providing individuals control over authority which significantly affects their life by participating in how that authority is used, demanding justifications, and holding power-wielders accountable in light of transparent information. We measure how well each value is instantiated on a four-fold range: 'significant' presence, 'limited' presence, 'nascent' presence, and 'absent' (see Table 3 ). The empirical case is then judged against these idealized democratic values.
Participation means that citizens affected by the exercise of authority should have the opportunity and ability to be involved in how that authority is wielded. This entails equal capacity to set the agenda as well as shape the rules, laws, and regulations that will affect their lives. We recognize that equality of participation may often rest upon forms of representation as individuals cannot always be directly involved in all decision-making processes. National representatives or self-appointed representatives (interest groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), etc.) can all help connect individuals with sites of authority (Macdonald 2008) . Precisely how equal participation is secured will and should vary depending upon the institutional scheme in need of democratic regulation, in this case orchestration.
Deliberation provides those affected by decisions with a rationale for how rules are being formulated and applied in various contexts (Habermas 1996) . This value derives largely from work in the field of deliberative democracy that stresses the importance of providing reciprocal and generalizable arguments for how authority is exercised and how it is connected to the public use of reasoning. Reciprocity means that justification is mutually acceptable to parties in a deliberation, whereas generalizability connotes a set of reasons that could be shared by affected parties due to shared institutional or moral structures. Deliberation also means that representatives of those affected have an opportunity to put their reasons forward and have a response.
Accountability, in a democratic sense, means that those affected by decisionmaking should have the right to hold power wielders 'to a set of standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have not been met' (Grant and Keohane 2005 COP15 thus fundamentally changed climate diplomacy by shifting from centralized bargaining to national plans aligned with the varying state interests (Falkner 2016 ).
This bottom-up logic was reinforced at subsequent UN climate summits in Cancun, Durban, and Warsaw. In the wake of the 2014 Lima COP, all states were asked to begin submitting intended NDCs. The Paris Agreement formalized this pledge-and-review system of voluntary commitments by establishing five-year 'global stocktakes' of NDCs coupled with a transparency framework -which engages non-state actors -for assessing the comparability of these pledges in an effort to ratchet up ambitions (UNFCCC 2015b). Along with these changes, the UNFCCC has constructed meta-intermediaries in an effort to move from regulation to orchestration (Abbott and Bernstein 2015) . In this article, we focus on two of these efforts: NAZCA and LPAA. In doing so, we exclude databases, registries and platforms of initiatives that are not orchestrated by the UN (Bulkeley et al. 2014) . 4 We also limit ourselves to climate commitments, noting however that they overlap with numerous orchestrating attempts such UN voluntary commitments for sustainable development. closed. These are steps towards stronger linkages between multilateral negotiations and the sphere of transnational action (Chan et al. 2016 , Hale 2016 ).
Orchestrator-Intermediary-Target and the UNFCCC
As previously discussed, orchestration can be systematically described in terms of the O-I-T relationship. How does the O-I-T relationship operate in the LPAA and
NAZCA, and what are tools of orchestration employed by UNFCCC?
Orchestrator: As detailed in Targets: At the end of the orchestration chain are states, private bodies, civil society actors, and individuals who are addressed by orchestrators through intermediaries (see Table 2 and Figure 1 ). Orchestration can either serve to create common rules for the conducts of states or serve as substitute or complement for state action by promoting regulation of private conduct of non-state actors, or by providing public good and services (Abbott et al 2016, p. 6) . Orchestration through LPAA and NAZCA captures very much the second function as a complement to state action.
Many of the initiatives in LPAA revolve around service provision, for example accelerating climate finance and providing clean energy (International Solar alliance, Africa Renewable Energy Initiative, Global Geothermal Alliance) or energy efficiency (Global Energy Efficiency Accelerator). LPAA and NAZCA, then, seek to direct the efforts of a plethora of actors on the ground. are enlisted through a number of orchestration mechanisms as illustrated in Table 2 .
Typology of Orchestration
[Insert Table 2 : "Orchestration in the UNFCCC " about here]
The Orchestration of Non-State Climate Governance: Democratic Legitimacy
We now assess what LPAA and NAZCA mean for the democratization of orchestrated climate governance. Before undertaking this analysis, we recognize a methodological challenge in our assessment. Since the non-state initiatives are found in a number of registries, we cannot assess the potential of all individual initiatives or pledges. Instead we often rely on meta-analyses assessing the aggregate effects of these initiatives (Chan et al. 2016; Hsu et al. 2015) . We argue that these metaassessments combined with our own empirical analysis of NAZCA and LPAA are sufficient to evaluate the democratic legitimacy of these orchestration efforts. Second, the non-state actors who document commitments are self-selected.
Participation (and representation) of non-state actors
Because it is an 'opt-in' scheme, actors have to fit within one of the existing NAZCA On balance, then, we suggest that LPAA and NAZCA can offer inclusive and participatory processes. Accordingly, LPAA is equitable in terms of including a range of non-state actor positions and even includes selection criteria to ensure accepted proposals are science-based, ambitious, inclusive, and possible to monitor. 9 However since both orchestration efforts contain pre-determined categories, only intermediaries that can comply with these categorization efforts can be included. This has the effect of limiting the agenda setting power of intermediaries and affected parties as the rules are set by the orchestrator.
Deliberation
How can deliberation be secured under orchestration so affected individuals can receive and contest justifications for decision-making by both the UNFCCC as orchestrator and the policies of intermediaries? On both points, it is clear that NAZCA and LPAA come up short, though again with LPAA faring better.
Starting with LPAA, this process fares reasonably well in terms of deliberative justification for two reasons: its multi-stakeholder design and clearer criteria of inclusion, and we discuss both in turn. First, this mode of high-level orchestration to mobilize civil society is an established practice in UN diplomacy since the first UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 (Abbott and Bernstein 2015) .
The LPAA thematic events at Paris COP21 offered venues for deliberation between governments and societal stakeholders. In the submissions for the Roadmap for Global Climate Action in advance of COP22, both parties and observers stressed the need to enhance dialogue between business, civil society, and subnational actors at and between COPs. These events have offered more direct justifications to some elements of civil society though, as with NAZCA, these justifications are not systematically offered to affected parties. This is because justifications in these fora are limited to accredited observer organizations at the COP or those who are able to view the webcasts.
Second, the UNFCCC has publicized and justified the criteria for LPAA inclusion and tailored these criteria according to the type of participation (such as contributions by states, cities, business, and civil society). These criteria comprise justificatory demands such as monitoring and reporting on a regular basis, demonstrating capacity to deliver on commitments, showcasing contributions in public ways, and "observ [ing] inclusiveness (e.g. balance regional representation)." report from a contributor is, the CDP explicitly says that a missing score does not indicate a lack of environmental impact, but may be a reporting error. This means that in-depth justifications about commitment levels, strategies, and outputs are substantially obscured from affected parties.
There are also few ways for the UNFCCC to monitor the implementation of NAZCA commitments. The decision by the UNFCCC to establish a bottom-up portal that they do not (or even cannot) monitor closely has not been directly justified by the UNFCCC. This is important because establishing NAZCA entails the use of public authority and it makes it difficult for affected individuals to understand how these actions could be seen as a credible commitment for tackling climate change. Because the COP decision to the Paris Agreement refers to both LPAA and NAZCA efforts as critical for ensuring that state commitments are ratcheted up over time, this gap must be taken seriously. By engaging a process of orchestration that stretches chains from the Secretariat on to the intermediary and then to watchdogs, it becomes clear that both the Secretariat and intermediaries are able to circumvent their duty to justify their activities. As states seek to reach the goals of the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC employs orchestration in this pursuit, justifying both the criteria for NAZCA inclusion and the activities of intermediaries would increase democratic legitimacy and make it clearer where implementation gaps exist. Ultimately, then, the level of deliberative quality offered by the UNFCCC both for and within NAZCA and the LPAA varies substantially. Justifications range considerably in depth and quality, but affected actors are excluded from both intermediary goals and the monitoring of orchestrated targets by the UNFCCC under NAZCA. Due to the clearer criteria under LPAA individual actors can more clearly understand the justifications for inclusion and action of intermediaries. As orchestration becomes an increasingly important governance practice directed by the UNFCCC to include and manage non-state actors, these shortcomings of deliberative legitimacy should be taken seriously.
Accountability and Transparency
As transparency and accountability are inextricably linked, we treat them in a single sub-section (however we disaggregate the two values in our matrix below). An important precondition for holding actors accountable is the availability and access to information through public disclosure (Bäckstrand 2008 , Peixoto 2013 . Without transparency, monitoring and tracking of progress, the aggregate impact of non-state commitments will be hampered which will, in turn, weaken accountability of both the UNFCCC and intermediaries. Resultantly, strengthening transparency and accountability of the broader range of non-state climate action has become a leitmotif of both the High-Level Champions in the roadmap climate action as well as in most submissions both from Parties and observers.
In terms of democratic legitimacy, it is important that accountability and A common theme in many of the recent reports on non-state climate commitments is the chronic lack of -and need for -stronger transparency and accountability (Chan et al. 2015 , Hsu et al. 2015 . A structural problem related to the various registries is that submission and reporting on initiatives occur on a voluntary basis and by means of self-description by various corporate, sub-state, and civil society actors. Yet the accountability of both LPAA and NAZCA are significantly lacking as the orchestrator is still in the process of setting up benchmarking, review procedures, or monitoring mechanisms so that stakeholders and governments can track process, compare performance, and identify best practices among the different initiatives (UNFCCC 2016c). With the emergence of the GCA, this lack of accountability and transparency has been officially recognized as the High-Level champions note: 'We need to help non-Party stakeholders achieve the recognition they seek. At the same time, we owe it to the integrity of the UNFCCC process to make sure that these initiatives and coalitions achieve the targets they set for themselves; that these targets are truly consistent with the long-term goals of the Paris (Chan et al. 2015 , Hsu et al. 2015 .
However, since initiatives encompass a diversity of actors, networks, and coalitions -elected mayors, investors, civil society, companies and regional governments -accountability mechanisms may be in place for individual initiatives.
Electoral and non-electoral accountability may operate in initiatives, for example mayors are held accountable by citizens, corporations by their stakeholders, and civil society organizations by their members. It seems plausible, though, that public scrutiny of the UNFCCC decision to engage in orchestration, as well as the activities of intermediaries, will also help curtail some of the governance gaps noted in current studies. Public accountability and transparency will increase the number of actors who can monitor intermediary efforts and report on non-compliance. It will likewise pressure the UNFCCC to monitor intermediaries more carefully as they construct criteria for inclusion and repeatedly claim that these efforts are essential in reaching the lofty goals of the Paris Agreement.
But ultimately there are many shortcomings in how orchestrated contributions are being measured in practice and a lack of ability for affected individuals to a) hold the UNFCCC accountable for failing to ensure that initiatives do not overlap, or b) hold intermediaries to account for failing to realize their commitments or take consideration for how their actions do or do not impact affected actors on the ground.
For these reasons we label both LPAA and NAZCA as having nascent or even absent accountability and transparency mechanisms in place. However, the adoption of the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action indicates that questions of transparency, tracking, and accountability of climate action will increasingly be addressed (UNFCCC 2016b). 
Summarizing Democratic Potential and Pitfalls
